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Abstract
Local content requirement is a popular government policy in developing countries
to regulate foreign direct investment. We establish a model with heterogeneous
multinational ¯rms and show that (a) the LCR policy a®ects the ¯rms' modes of
entry to a new market, with FDI being more likely to be adopted for a lower LCR;
and (b) when facing the same LCR, a less e±cient ¯rm is more likely to adopt the
FDI mode than a more e±cient ¯rm. Furthermore, we investigate the design of
optimal LCR policy. Two types of FDI bene¯t are considered, and two types of
LCR policy are compared.
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There is little chance that companies trying to do business in the developing world
will escape this rising tide of local content demands.
Wall Street Journal (31 July 1984).
1. Introduction
The world is increasingly polarized between developed countries with superior technologies
but saturating markets and developing countries with backward technologies but relatively un-
explored markets. While ¯rms from developed countries may prefer to export their products to
the unexplored markets, developing countries attempt to use their market potential to attract
foreign direct investment (FDI). This is because, in contrast to export, foreign direct investment
by multinational enterprises (MNEs) may raise employment and enhance technology transfer in
developing countries.
In order to fully realize the employment and technology-transfer bene¯t, developing coun-
tries commonly impose local content requirement (LCR) on FDI. As the LCR policy requires the
multinational ¯rms to use a certain proportion of locally made parts and components, employ-
ment in the local parts industries is bound to increase. Furthermore, to maintain the quality
of their ¯nal products, it is also necessary for the multinational ¯rms to transfer technology
to the local parts industries. Thus, LCR becomes a popular government regulation of FDI in
developing countries.1 As reported by UNIDO (1986, p. 10), in a sample of 50 countries, 27 (or
54%), mostly developing countries, have LCR policies for FDI in the automobile industry alone
in 1980.2
Although LCR is an important policy with respect to FDI, it has received much less attention
in the literature than policies directed at international trade.3 This paper is an attempt to
1For more discussion on the bene¯ts of the LCR, see UNIDO (1986, pp. 6-7).
2The percentage of local inputs ranges from 15% to as high as 100%. Detailed information can be
found in Table 3 contained in UNIDO (1986). More recently, the LCR in the automobile industry was
up to 60% in Malaysia (Financial Times, 16 May 1990), and as high as 80-90% in China (Qiu, 1997).
3It is well recognized that the TRIMs (Trade Related Investment Measures) agreement under the
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analyze LCR policy. We ¯rst examine how LCR a®ects the multinational ¯rms' modes of entry
into a new market, i.e., export and FDI. We then investigate the design of optimal LCR policy.
While a tari® makes the export mode less attractive to multinationals than the FDI mode,
the reverse holds for an LCR policy. We ¯nd that, when facing the same LCR policy, a less
e±cient multinational ¯rm (in terms of the cost of production) is more likely to adopt the FDI
mode than a more e±cient one. Intuitively, the LCR policy pushes up the cost of production for
multinational ¯rms, as the locally made parts and components are of lower quality and higher
cost. However, for a given LCR policy, the relative cost increase for the more e±cient MNE is
higher than that for the less e±cient MNE.4 Thus, for a certain range of the LCR, we may see
the more e±cient MNEs choosing the export mode, and the less e±cient ones the FDI mode.
The design of optimal LCR policy is complicated by the endogeneity of the multinationals'
entry modes. As discussed above, the LCR policy makes it less likely for the multinational ¯rms
to choose the FDI mode than the export mode. Given that the multinational ¯rms take the FDI
mode, however, the LCR policy allows the host country to fully capture the employment and
technology-transfer bene¯t of FDI. Meanwhile, the LCR policy adversely a®ects the consumer
surplus, as it raises the cost of production for those MNEs that choose the FDI mode.
The host government cares about both the consumer surplus and the FDI bene¯t. While
it is straightforward to de¯ne the consumer surplus, the speci¯cation of the FDI bene¯t can
be complicated. For tractability of analysis, we assume two reduced forms of FDI bene¯t:
(1) the host government cares exclusively about the employment created by the FDI in the
upstream industries, and (2) the host government cares exclusively about the technology transfer
Uruguay Round will make LCR illegal in a few years. But this does not undermine the importance of
studying LCR, for at least two reasons. First, compared with the trade policies, LCR receives much less
scrutiny in the literature. Studying LCR will help us to understand the past and current state of FDI
in developing countries. Second, it is very unlikely that the TRIMs agreement will be strictly enforced
in the near future, especially in developing countries. Wonnacott (1996, p. 97) has well explained this
latter concern. In fact, a recent meeting of the WTO heard requests from seven developing countries
(Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Romania) for an extension of the
deadline, varying from ¯ve months to seven years, for trade restrictions on foreign investors (mainly LCR)
in the vehicle sectors (Financial Times, 25 January 2000).
4The following hypothetical example illustrates this point. Suppose that without FDI, ¯rm 1 spends
$100 and ¯rm 2 $200 on components. The LCR policy requires that a ¯rm must use at least 50% local
parts, which costs $200. As a result, with FDI, ¯rm 1's cost becomes $250, a 150% increase, and ¯rm 2's
cost becomes $300, a 50% increase.
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accomplished by the FDI in the upstream industries. In our analysis of optimal LCR policy,
we consider both the discriminatory LCR policy, which allows for di®erent degrees of LCR to
di®erent ¯rms, and the uniform LCR policy, which applies the same degree of LCR to all ¯rms.
The basic results can be summarized as follows. If the LCR is constrained to be uniform and
the employment bene¯t is the main concern, then large cost di®erences between multinationals
result in an LCR that induces the more cost-e±cient ¯rm to export and the less cost-e±cient
¯rm to choose FDI; for small cost di®erences, the optimal LCR induces both ¯rms to choose
FDI. If the technology bene¯t is the main concern, then the optimal uniform LCR leads to
both ¯rms choosing FDI. However, the optimal discriminatory LCR always induces both ¯rms
to choose FDI. The LCR is larger on the less e±cient ¯rm if the employment bene¯t is most
important; but it may be larger on the more e±cient ¯rm if the technology bene¯t is most
important. These results bear strong empirical implications.
There is a growing literature on the LCR. Grossman (1981) systematically analyzes the
e®ects of content protection on resource reallocation, with a particular focus on the intermediate
goods. He ¯nds that a conclusion about the degree of protection that the LCR gives to domestic
intermediate goods is hard to reach, as it depends on the substitution possibilities in production,
the supply conditions in the domestic intermediate-good industry, and the market structure for
that good. Most recently, Lahiri and Ono (1998) have focused on the welfare implication of
FDI and investigated the host country's optimal policy combination, which includes a pro¯t
tax/subsidy and an LCR on FDI. They characterize the optimal LCR policy, which depends on
the number of domestic ¯rms, the number of foreign MNEs, and the ¯rms' costs. They ¯nd that
it is optimal to tax the pro¯ts of the foreign MNEs if and only if the local costs are higher than
twice the foreign costs. In contrast with these studies, our study explores why and how LCR
a®ects MNEs' FDI-export decisions di®erently, and how the host government designs an optimal
LCR policy on FDI from heterogenous foreign ¯rms. Grossman (1981) assumes a competitive
¯nal-good market, and Lahiri and Ono (1998) assume identical foreign MNEs. Hence, their
models necessarily exclude the issues investigated in the present paper.5
5In between Grossman (1981) and Lahiri and Ono (1998), there are also some other studies related to
LCR, which include Davidson, Matusz, and Kreinin (1985), Hollander (1987), Krishna and Itoh (1988),
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Researchers in international business and international trade have attempted to explain
why MNEs invest abroad, instead of exporting their products or licensing their technologies to
foreign countries.6 According to Dunning (1977, 1981), an MNE will choose FDI over export and
licensing if there are ownership advantage, location advantage, and internalization advantage.
Because these factors vary from country to country and from industry to industry, we can easily
observe that di®erent countries attract di®erent amounts of FDI, as do di®erent industries in
the same country. It is equally transparent that MNEs from di®erent countries or di®erent
industries have di®erent incentives to make FDI.7 In this paper, we explain why MNEs in the
same industry adopt di®erent modes (i.e., FDI and export) to enter the same market.8 We show
that, other things being equal, ¯rms that di®er in production cost will realize di®erent levels of
FDI location advantage and thus may adopt di®erent entry modes.9
There are two distinguishing features in our model. First, we consider a more realistic case
in which the ¯nal good is tradable, whereas previous studies in the literature have essentially
assumed that the ¯nal good is nontradable. This feature allows us to examine LCR's in°uence
on MNEs' choice of entry modes. Second, while the literature typically assumes identical foreign
¯rms, we consider heterogeneous foreign ¯rms. This unique feature opens up the opportunity
for us to explain the di®erent entry modes adopted by di®erent MNEs, and to derive di®erent
optimal LCR policies for di®erent foreign ¯rms (i.e., the discriminatory LCR).
Richardson (1991, 1993), Chao and Yu (1993), and Lopez-de-Silanes, Markusen, and Rutherford (1996).
However, none of them considers asymmetric entry modes and optimal LCR policy. See Belderbos and
Sleuwaegen (1997) for a very brief survey.
6The literature on MNEs and FDI is very large and still growing. Early contributions were made
by researchers in the ¯eld of international business, including Hymer (1976), Dunning (1977, 1981),
and Caves (1982). International economists have also contributed to this literature, particularly with
formal economic models. They include Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984), Ethier (1986), Horstmann
and Markusen (1987, 1992, 1995), Brainard (1993), and Ethier and Markusen (1996). Markusen (1995)
has a nice survey of the literature, paying particular attention to research and models produced by
international economists.
7In their empirical study, Mody and Srinivasan (1998) ¯nd that the Japanese MNEs and the U.S.
MNEs behave di®erently in their FDIs. Feinberg, Keane, and Bognanno (1998) ¯nd that the U.S. MNEs
that have invested in Canada respond to Canadian tari® changes di®erently.
8See Qiu (1997) for such examples in China's automobile industry.
9Internalization advantage is used to explain the choice of FDI over licensing. Ownership advantage
is a necessary, but not su±cient, condition for choosing FDI over export. Since we only compare FDI
and export modes and we know that all foreign automakers have ownership advantage, we can just focus
on the location advantage.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the model and analyze
asymmetric MNEs' responses to LCR. In Section 3, we discuss the framework for optimal policy
analysis. We analyze the optimal discriminatory LCR policy in Section 4, and the optimal
uniform LCR policy in Section 5. Our concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2. The Choice between FDI and Export
Suppose there are two multinational enterprises, henceforth referred to as ¯rm 1 and ¯rm 2.
They produce a homogeneous product and consider entry to the market of a developing country,
called the host country. Each ¯rm can enter the market via export or FDI.10 To focus on the
multinationals' choices of entry mode, we assume away any local competitor in the market for
the ¯nal product.11 Demand in the host market is characterized by P = P (q1 + q2), where qi is
the quantity produced by ¯rm i (i = 1; 2) and P (¢) has the usual properties.
In modern manufacturing industries such as the automobile industry, a ¯nal product is
assembled from a set of parts and components. Thus the production cost includes the cost of
parts and components and that of assembly. To facilitate our analysis of the LCR policy, we
only consider the cost of parts and components. Speci¯cally, we assume that there is no ¯xed
cost of production and each ¯rm's marginal cost of parts and components (denoted by ci) is
constant. Thus, ci is ¯rm i's unit cost of production. Without loss of generality, we assume that
¯rm 1 is more cost-e±cient than ¯rm 2: c1 < c2.
If ¯rm i chooses to export its product to the new market, it pays an additional cost per unit
of output, denoted by t. This cost includes transportation cost and trade barriers (tari® and
nontari®). Henceforth, t is referred to as the cost of export.
If ¯rm i chooses to make FDI in the host country, then it needs to comply with the LCR
policy imposed by the host government. An LCR policy speci¯es that a certain fraction, de-
10We exclude the possibility of licensing, and focus on the choice between export and FDI, which
is overlooked in the existing literature on LCR. Speci¯cally, Grossman (1981) does not analyze entry
decisions, and Lahiri and Ono (1998) do not consider export and licensing.
11In the case of Volkswagen's FDI in China, \competition from other domestic car makers has yet
to become the major threat to VW's business in China. More than domestic competition, VW feels
it is imports that are having the biggest impact on sales, especially Japanese and South Korean cars."
(EIU, 1996, p. 3.) In 1995, the Chinese market had 322,000 domestically made cars (more than 90% by
Sino-foreign joint ventures) and 158,000 imported cars (EIU, 1997, p. 2).
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noted by ¸i 2 [0; 1], of parts and components for the ¯nal-good production must be locally
made.12 Moreover, if the LCR is met, there is no tari® on the import of the remaining parts
and components. Let ¹c be the unit cost of production if a ¯rm uses all local parts and compo-
nents. For the LCR to be meaningful, assume that ¹c is higher than c1 and c2.
13 Then, with
the LCR policy, a ¯rm choosing the FDI mode will only use the local parts and components
up to ¸i and import the rest from its home market, which implies its unit cost of production is
¸i¹c+ (1¡ ¸i)ci = ci + ¸i(¹c¡ ci).14 Henceforth ¸i(¹c¡ ci) is referred to as the cost of FDI.
For ease of exposition, we introduce an index function, zi, to capture ¯rm i's entry mode,
with zi = 0 representing export and zi = 1 for FDI. Moreover, de¯ne
eci ´ ¹c¡ ci and ¸oi ´ t=eci; i = 1; 2:
Then, based on the above discussion, we obtain the unit cost function of ¯rm i as15
Ci ´ ci + ¸izieci + (1¡ zi)t; where ¸i 2 [0; 1] and zi = f0; 1g:
Accordingly, ¯rm i's FDI cost is ¸izieci; export cost is (1¡ zi)t; and pro¯t is ¼i = (P ¡ Ci)qi:
Firms 1 and 2 play a two-stage game: at the ¯rst stage they choose the entry modes, and
at the second stage they compete in the market by choosing their levels of output. There are
four possible outcomes for the ¯rst stage of the game: (E, E), (E, I), (I, E), and (I, I), where E
denotes export, I denotes FDI, and the ¯rst (second) component of a pair represents the entry
mode of ¯rm 1 (¯rm 2). We follow the backward induction principle by ¯rst considering the
12In practice, if a ¯rm fails to meet the LCR, punitive tari®s could be levied on its imports of parts
and components. We assume that the punitive tari®s are so high that the ¯rm will never violate the LCR
if it chooses the FDI mode.
13Both Grossman (1981) and Lahiri and Ono (1998) make this assumption without any justi¯cation.
What we have in mind is that the locally produced parts and components are of lower quality than what
¯rm 1 and ¯rm 2 can obtain from their own markets. Consequently, the quality-adjusted unit cost of
local parts and components is higher than c1 and c2.
14Lahiri and Ono (1998) also use this cost structure. Grossman (1981) distinguishes between an LCR
de¯ned in physical terms and one de¯ned in value terms, since he wants to examine their di®erent e®ects
on the upstream industry. Nevertheless, determining local content in value terms is nebulous, as the
¯gures can be manipulated by exaggerating the value of local parts and components. Grossman (1981)
avoids this problem by assuming exogenous prices for both intermediate and ¯nal products.
15Both export and FDI involve some setup costs. However, the e®ects of these costs on a ¯rm's choice
of entry mode are obvious. To focus on more important issues, we omit these ¯xed costs in our model.
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quantity competition between the two ¯rms given their entry modes and then investigating the
equilibrium entry modes.
Given the entry modes of the ¯rst stage, i.e., (z1; z2), the ¯rms engage in a Cournot com-
petition at the second stage. The equilibrium output levels are determined by the following
¯rst-order conditions:
P 0qi + P ¡ Ci = 0; i = 1; 2: (1)
Total di®erentiation yields the result that a ¯rm's equilibrium output (denoted by q¤i ) decreases
with its own unit cost of production but increases in its rival ¯rm's unit cost of production:16
@q¤i =@Ci < 0 and @q
¤
i =@Cj > 0, where i or j = 1; 2 and i 6= j.
Using the envelope theorem, we can also show that the equilibrium pro¯t of a ¯rm (¼¤i )
decreases with its unit cost of production, speci¯cally,
@¼¤i
@Ci
= q¤i
µ
P 0
@q¤j
@Ci
¡ 1
¶
< 0:
Intuitively, raising cost lowers pro¯t directly and also through increasing the competitor's output.
Note further that this result holds regardless of whether or not the competitor takes the export
mode or the FDI mode. It follows that each ¯rm chooses the lower-cost mode of entry regardless
of the competitor's choice of entry mode. Recall that ¯rm i's unit cost is ci + ¸i(¹c ¡ ci) in the
case of FDI and ci+ t in the case of export. If the cost of FDI is higher than that of export, i.e.,
¸i(¹c¡ ci) > t, then it is optimal for ¯rm i to choose export (or zi = 0). Otherwise, it is optimal
for ¯rm i to choose FDI (or zi = 1).
17 We summarize the above analysis with the following
proposition:
Proposition 1: Firm i chooses FDI as its optimal entry mode (i.e., zi = 1) if and only if
¸i · ¸oi . Under the uniform LCR policy in which ¸1 = ¸2 ´ ¸ and given that t is not too big,
we will observe the following equilibrium outcomes sequentially: (E, E), (E, I), and (I, I), as ¸
decreases from one to zero.
16We assume downward-sloping reaction curves and satisfaction of the stability conditions, which are
P 00qi+2P 0 < 0; P 00qi+P 0 < 0; and A ´ (P 00q1+2P 0)(P 00q2+2P 0)¡ (P 00q1+P 0)(P 00q2+P 0) > 0: Then
@q¤i =@Ci =(P
00qj + 2P 0)=A < 0 and @q¤i =@Cj = ¡(P 00qi + P 0)=A > 0:
17We assume that a ¯rm will choose FDI when it is indi®erent between export and FDI.
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If there is only one ¯rm contemplating entry to a new market, it is clear that its choice
between export and FDI depends upon their relative cost. However, it is interesting to note
that, even when there are two ¯rms, one ¯rm's entry mode is independent of the other ¯rm's.
While this result is obtained under several simplifying assumptions, the intuitive appeal of this
result is quite strong.
The equilibrium outcome is determined by the interplay of the export cost (t) and the LCR
policy (¸i). Given an LCR, a ¯rm is more likely to choose FDI over export if the export cost
is higher. This result is exactly the same as the \tari®-jumping" argument for FDI, which has
been discussed extensively in the literature. What is less understood is the e®ect of LCR policy
on the equilibrium entry mode.
Note that a higher LCR makes it less likely for a ¯rm to choose the FDI mode. This is
because the FDI cost comes from the mandatory use of expensive local parts and components,
and it increases in the level of LCR. Given that the export cost is ¯xed, a ¯rm switches its entry
mode from FDI to export as the LCR increases from zero to one. Furthermore, the level of
LCR at which ¯rm 1 (the more cost-e±cient ¯rm) switches from FDI to export is lower than
that for ¯rm 2 (formally, ¸o1 < ¸
o
2). Intuitively, because without LCR ¯rm 1's cost is lower than
¯rm 2's cost, the cost increase from using any given percentage of expensive local parts and
components is higher for ¯rm 1 than ¯rm 2. Hence, in the case of uniform LCR policy, there
exists an intermediate range of ¸ satisfying ¸ec1 > t ¸ ¸ec2 [or ¸ 2 (t=ec1; t=ec2]] under which ¯rm
1 chooses the export mode but ¯rm 2 takes the FDI mode. It is worth pointing out that, in this
case, the ¯rm choosing FDI is the less cost-e±cient one, which may not be desirable from the
host government's point of view and can be avoided if the discriminatory LCR policy is adopted.
3. A Framework for Analyzing Optimal LCR Policy
We have analyzed how the multinational ¯rms choose between export and FDI given the
LCR policy. In the rest of the paper, we investigate the design of optimal LCR policy from the
host government's point of view. To sharpen the focus, we reinterpret the export cost t as an
exogenous transportation cost. The host government chooses the LCR to maximize its social
8
welfare consisting of FDI bene¯t and consumer surplus.18
While it is straightforward to de¯ne the consumer surplus, the speci¯cation of the FDI
bene¯t can be complicated. A detailed analysis would involve modeling of the FDI process. A
multinational ¯rm may simply set up an assembly line in the host country and buy low-quality
parts and components from the local industries. Or it may get more involved by licensing
technologies to the local parts and components industries.19 In the former case, the bene¯t of
FDI to the host country is the employment generated in the parts and components industries.
In the latter case, the bene¯t includes not only the employment but also the technology transfer
in the upstream industries.
To make our analysis of optimal LCR policy tractable, however, we assume two reduced
forms of FDI bene¯t. First, the host government cares about the employment generated by the
FDI. Given that each unit of output from FDI requires a certain amount of local input (¸i¹c),
this FDI bene¯t can be proxied by ¸1cz1q1+ ¸2cz2q2. Second, the host government cares about
the technological upgrading provided by the FDI. In this case, the FDI bene¯t can be proxied by
the technological gap between the multinationals and the local parts industries, and is assumed
to take the form ¸1ec1z1q1 + ¸2ec2z2q2. In summary, the host government's welfare function is
W (¸1; ¸2) = s£ FDI Benefit + Consumer Surplus;
where the FDI bene¯t can be either ¸1cz1q1 + ¸2cz2q2 or ¸1ec1z1q1 + ¸2ec2z2q2, the consumer
surplus is
R q1+q2
0 [P (Q)¡ P (q1 + q2)]dQ, and s is the weight placed by the host government on
the FDI bene¯t relative to the consumer surplus.20
18Lahiri and Ono (1998) also include the FDI bene¯t in the host government's welfare function. In
the present paper pro¯ts are not shown in the welfare function, as there is no domestic producer of ¯nal
product.
19See Woodard and Zhu (1994) and EIU (1997) for examples. Technology transfer helps to improve the
quality of locally made parts and components. However, the cost may remain high, as if there were no
technology transfer, because the multinational ¯rm can be expected to adjust its licensing fee to re°ect
the technological gap.
20We can treat such a welfare function as the reduced form of government welfare derived from a
political-economy framework [Grossman and Helpman (1994)]. Then s can be reinterpreted as the weight
that the government places on lobbying by the special interest group: workers (in the case of employment)
or the upstream industries (in the case of technological upgrading). We thank a referee for suggesting
this political-economy interpretation of the welfare function.
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The government chooses ¸'s to maximize its social welfare. To derive the optimal LCR policy,
we need to know how the ¸'s a®ect the ¯rms' entry modes, which was studied in Section 2 and
summarized in Proposition 1. We also need to know how the ¸'s a®ect the equilibrium outputs.
For simplicity of analysis, we assume a linear demand curve, P = a ¡ b(q1 + q2), where a and
b are positive constants with a being su±ciently large.21 Then, using the ¯rst-order condition
(1), we can derive the Cournot equilibrium outputs and the consumer surplus (denoted by CS):
q1 =
a¡ 2C1 + C2
3b
; q2 =
a¡ 2C2 + C1
3b
; and CS =
b(q1 + q2)
2
2
: (2)
Depending on how ¸'s a®ect C's, we can determine the e®ects of ¸'s on q's and subsequently
the consumer surplus.
Our analysis of optimal LCR policy is organized as follows. In Section 4 we analyze the
discriminatory LCR policy in which ¸1 can be di®erent from ¸2; in Section 5 we examine the
uniform LCR policy (¸1 = ¸2). In each case, we investigate how the optimal LCR policy will
di®er if the host government mostly cares about the employment bene¯t of FDI from that if
it mostly cares about the technological catching-up e®ect. We also highlight the di®erences
between the optimal discriminatory and uniform LCR policies.
4. Discriminatory LCR Policy
We ¯rst derive in Section 4.1 the optimal discriminatory LCR policy when the host govern-
ment is mainly concerned about the employment bene¯t and then derive in Section 4.2 the one
when the government cares mostly the technology transfer bene¯t. A comparison of the two
optimal policies and its implications for the implementability and testability of the policies are
brie°y discussed at the end of this section.
4.1. FDI bene¯t | employment
When discriminatory LCR policy is used and the employment bene¯t is mostly concerned,
the host government chooses ¸1 and ¸2 to maximize
W (¸1; ¸2) = s£ (¸1cz1q1 + ¸2cz2q2) + CS:
21It is not uncommon in the literature that speci¯c demand functions are assumed for welfare analysis.
See for example, Dixit (1988) and Markusen (1998).
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Recall from Proposition 1 that ¯rm i engages in FDI if ¸i · ¸oi and chooses export otherwise.22
Hence we have
Ci =
½
¸i¹c+ (1¡ ¸i)ci for ¸i · ¸oi ;
ci + t otherwise;
and
@Ci
@¸i
=
½ eci for ¸i · ¸oi ;
0 otherwise.
(3)
Only when a ¯rm (say, ¯rm i) adopts the FDI mode, then, is its cost of production adversely
a®ected by the LCR. Firm j's cost of production is not directly a®ected by the LCR imposed
on ¯rm i. Consequently, for a higher ¸i 2 [0; ¸oi ], ¯rm i's output shrinks while ¯rm j's expands.
Furthermore, it can be shown that as ¸i increases, the total output (q1+ q2), or equivalently the
consumer surplus, decreases for ¸i 2 [0; ¸oi ] and becomes constant for ¸i > ¸oi . Formally,
@ CS
@¸i
=
½ ¡eci(q1 + q2)=3 for ¸i · ¸oi ;
0 otherwise.
(4)
Thus, if the host government cares exclusively about the consumer surplus, it should set ¸i as
low as possible.
Next we examine how ¸i a®ects the FDI bene¯t. Di®erentiating the FDI bene¯t with respect
to ¸i yields
@(FDI Benefit)
@¸i
= ¹cziqi ¡ ¸i¹czi 2
3b
@Ci
@¸i
+ ¸j¹czj
1
3b
@Ci
@¸i
: (5)
The ¯rst two terms capture the e®ect of ¸i on the FDI bene¯t contributed directly by ¯rm i:
¸icziqi. The third term is the e®ect of ¸i on the FDI bene¯t contributed directly by ¯rm j:
¸jczjqj . As discussed earlier, a higher ¸i 2 [0; ¸oi ] pushes up ¯rm i's cost of production, which
leads to higher output by ¯rm j. Hence, this latter e®ect increases in ¸i. Nevertheless, recalling
from Proposition 1 that zi = 0 for ¸i > ¸
o
i , both e®ects disappear when ¸i > ¸
o
i .
Based on the above analysis on consumer surplus and FDI bene¯t, it is clear that the host
government should choose ¸¤i within [0; ¸
o
i ], where i=1, 2. In other words, under the optimal
discriminatory LCR policy, both ¯rm 1 and ¯rm 2 undertake FDI. The remaining analysis then
is focused on the comparison between ¸¤1 and ¸¤2.
Note that with z1 = z2 = 1, (5) can be simpli¯ed as
@(FDI Benefit)
@¸i
= ¹c
µ
qi ¡ 2
3b
¸ieci + 1
3b
¸jeci¶ : (6)
22To make our analysis interesting, we assume ¸o2 < 1 or equivalently t < ec2.
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It can be easily checked that @(FDI Benefit)=@¸i is decreasing in ¸i, being positive for small ¸i
but negative for large ¸i. When deciding on the speci¯c level of ¸
¤
i , the host government weighs
the marginal bene¯t of raising ¸i [i.e., s£ @(FDI Benefit)=@¸i] against its marginal cost (i.e.,
@CS=@¸i). At the optimal ¸
¤
i , the marginal bene¯t equals the marginal cost. Note that the
marginal bene¯t of raising ¸i is positively correlated with the parameter s, while its cost is
independent of s. Hence the optimal ¸¤i increases in s. Speci¯cally, if s is below some minimum
level of s, the marginal bene¯t of raising ¸i is always lower than the marginal cost. This calls
for setting ¸i as low as possible, i.e., ¸
¤
i = 0. In contrast, if s is above some maximum level of s,
the marginal bene¯t of raising ¸i is always greater than the marginal cost. This calls for setting
¸i as high as possible, i.e., ¸
¤
i = ¸
o
i . For moderate s, there exists a unique ¸
¤
i 2 (0; ¸oi ) such
that the marginal bene¯t equals the marginal cost. Obviously, it is interesting to just focus on
the comparison between ¸¤1 and ¸¤2 when both policies take interior solutions. In the Appendix
(A), we characterize the conditions for moderate s.
Proposition 2: If employment is the main source of FDI bene¯t to the host country, then
the optimal discriminatory LCR policy induces both multinational ¯rms to undertake FDI, i.e.,
¸¤i 2 [0; ¸oi ]. Moreover, the optimal LCR for the more cost-e±cient ¯rm is lower than that for
the less e±cient ¯rm, i.e., ¸¤1 < ¸¤2.
Proof: See the Appendix (A). 2
The proposition says that the host government o®ers a more favorable (from the ¯rm's point
of view) LCR policy to the more cost-e±cient ¯rm. To understand this result, note that the
(negative) marginal e®ect of raising ¸1 on consumer surplus [i.e., ec1(q1 + q2)=3; from (4)] is
higher than that of raising ¸2 [i.e., ec2(q1 + q2)=3; from (4)]. Intuitively, since ¯rm 1 is more
e±cient than ¯rm 2, an increase in LCR leads to a higher cost increase for ¯rm 1 than for ¯rm
2. It follows that the total output reduction and consequently the consumer surplus decrease
are more sensitive to an increase in ¯rm 1's LCR than ¯rm 2's LCR.
On the other hand, the (positive) marginal e®ect of raising ¸1 on the FDI bene¯t may or
may not be lower than that of raising ¸2. However, the result in Proposition 2 indicates that
the net welfare increase of raising ¸1 [i.e., @(FDI Benefit)=@¸1 ¡ @CS=@¸1] is smaller than
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that of raising ¸2 [i.e., @(FDI Benefit)=@¸2 ¡ @CS=@¸2].
4.2. FDI bene¯t | technological upgrading
We now consider the case where the host government cares about the technological catching-
up e®ect of FDI and chooses ¸1 and ¸2 to maximize
W (¸1; ¸2) = s£ (¸1 ec1z1q1 + ¸2 ec2z2q2) + CS:
The analysis for this case is similar to that of Section 4.1. In particular, (3)-(4) still apply.
However, the e®ect of ¸i on the FDI bene¯t needs to be modi¯ed. Here,
@(FDI Benefit)
@¸i
= eciziqi ¡ ¸iecizi 2
3b
@Ci
@¸i
+ ¸jecjzj 1
3b
@Ci
@¸i
: (7)
As in Section 4.1, it can be shown that the optimal discriminatory LCR policy induces both
¯rm 1 and ¯rm 2 to undertake FDI, i.e., ¸¤i 2 [0; ¸oi ] for i = 1; 2. This simpli¯es (7) to
@(FDI Benefit)
@¸i
= eciµqi ¡ 2
3b
¸ieci + 1
3b
¸jeci¶ ; (8)
which decreases in ¸i and is positive for small ¸i and negative for large ¸i. For the same reason
given in Section 4.1, we can easily see and we prove in the Appendix (B) that ¸¤i = 0 for small
s, ¸¤i = ¸oi for large s, and ¸¤i 2 (0; ¸oi ) for moderate s: By focusing on the most interesting
case where both ¸¤1 and ¸¤2 take interior solutions (i.e., the case of moderate s), we establish
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: If technological upgrading is the main FDI bene¯t to the host country, then
the optimal discriminatory LCR policy induces both multinational ¯rms to undertake FDI. The
optimal LCR for the more cost-e±cient ¯rm is higher than that for the less e±cient ¯rm if s is
not too large. Speci¯cally,
¸¤i =
2a(3s¡ 2)¡ 3(2s¡ 1)ci + cj
4(3s¡ 1)eci 2 [0; ¸oi ] and ¸¤1 > ¸¤2;
where the comparison holds when s < (4a¡ 2¹c¡ c1 ¡ c2)=6(a¡ ¹c).
Proof: See the Appendix (B). 2
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Recall from Section 4.1 that, when the host government cares about the employment bene¯t
of FDI, it always sets a lower LCR for ¯rm 1 than for ¯rm 2. This result no longer holds when
the government is concerned with the technological catching-up e®ect of FDI and s is not too
large. This sharp contrast can be understood as follows. Under the speci¯cation of FDI bene¯t
in Section 4.1, the loss of consumer surplus from a higher ¸1 dominates the gain of FDI bene¯t,
and hence the host government imposes a lower LCR on ¯rm 1, to avoid large welfare losses.
When the host government cares about the technological catching-up e®ect of FDI, however,
the FDI bene¯t contributed by the more cost-e±cient ¯rm 1 becomes dominant, and hence the
host government imposes a higher LCR on ¯rm 1, to extract more welfare gains.
In this section, we have shown that the optimal discriminatory LCR always induces both
¯rms to choose FDI. However, di®erent degrees of LCR should be imposed on di®erent ¯rms. We
would like to discuss here the implementability of the optimal policy and draw some testable
implications from Propositions 2-3. According to the analysis of the optimal discriminatory
policy in this section, two pieces of information are key to the design and implementation of
the optimal policy. First, the host government needs to know the type of FDI bene¯t that
the multinational ¯rms bring to the country. Second, the government needs to identify which
¯rm is the more cost-e±cient one. The same information is also needed if we are to test the
theory in the real world. We argue that this information can be obtained, at least indirectly.
First, a close examination of the FDI process in a particular industry would reveal whether the
FDI bene¯t includes mostly employment (it does if there is no technology licensing involved)
or a combination of employment and technological upgrading (it does if technology licensing is
involved). Second, the unit costs of production may not be directly observable, but they can be
inferred from the ¯rms' market shares. In particular, the more cost-e±cient ¯rm is expected to
have a larger market share. Therefore, we should expect to see that when there is no technology
licensing, the ¯rm with a larger market share is o®ered a more favorable LCR policy; but when
the FDI bene¯t is mainly from technology licensing, the ¯rm with a larger market share is o®ered
a less favorable LCR policy.
5. Uniform LCR Policy
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While it is optimal from the host country's point of view to impose di®erent LCRs on di®erent
multinational ¯rms, a lower LCR is always preferred by the ¯rms. If the ¯rms strategically distort
the market outcomes in order to receive a more favorable LCR policy, the market information
is no longer useful for guiding the design of the optimal discriminatory LCR policy. Moreover,
a discriminatory policy is often di±cult to be monitored and enforced. Finally, in reality,
governments may even be restricted from having discriminatory policies. For these reasons, it is
appropriate to consider the case in which the host government is constrained to o®er the same
LCR policy to all multinational ¯rms.
We denote the uniform LCR policy by ¸. From Proposition 1, we know how an increase in
the level of LCR a®ects the ¯rms' choices of entry mode. Speci¯cally, for ¸ · ¸o1, both ¯rm 1
and ¯rm 2 engage in FDI; for ¸o1 < ¸ · ¸o2, ¯rm 1 chooses export while ¯rm 2 engages in FDI;
for ¸ > ¸o2, both ¯rms choose export. Therefore, we have
Ci =
½
¸¹c+ (1¡ ¸)ci for ¸ · ¸oi ;
ci + t otherwise
and
@Ci
@¸
=
½ eci for ¸ · ¸oi ;
0 otherwise.
Intuitively, an increase in ¸ pushes up a ¯rm's cost of production so long as the ¯rm chooses the
FDI mode (for ¸ · ¸oi ), but it ceases to have any e®ect when the ¯rm switches its mode from
FDI to export (for ¸ > ¸oi ). It follows that the total output and consequently the consumer
surplus decrease in ¸ over [0; ¸o2], and they become constant for ¸ > ¸
o
2. Formally,
@ CS
@¸
=
8<:
¡(ec1 + ec2)(q1 + q2)=3 for ¸ · ¸o1;
¡ec2(q1 + q2)=3 for ¸o1 < ¸ · ¸o2;
0 otherwise:
Therefore, if the host government is only concerned about the consumer surplus, it should set
the LCR as low as possible. Also note that for ¸ > ¸o2, neither ¯rm 1 nor ¯rm 2 undertakes FDI,
and hence there is no FDI bene¯t. Therefore, the LCR should not be set so high that neither
¯rm engages in FDI; that is, the optimal ¸¤ must be in either [0; ¸o1] or (¸o1; ¸o2]. But further
characterizing the optimal LCR requires the speci¯cation of the welfare function.
5.1. FDI bene¯t | employment
We ¯rst consider the case where the host government cares about the employment bene¯t
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of FDI and chooses ¸ to maximize
W (¸) = s£ (¸¹cz1q1 + ¸¹cz2q2) + CS:
To determine whether the optimal ¸¤ is in the range of [0; ¸o1] or (¸o1; ¸o2], we need to compare
the social welfare in these two ranges. However, the comparison is made complicated by the fact
that the functional form of social welfare for ¸ 2 [0; ¸o1] is di®erent from that for ¸ 2 (¸o1; ¸o2].
Speci¯cally, the welfare function for ¸ 2 [0; ¸o1] is
s¸¹c(q1 + q2) +
1
2
b(q1 + q2)
2; (9)
where q1 and q2 are the equilibrium outputs when both ¯rms choose FDI, which are obtained
using Ci = ¸¹c+ (1¡ ¸)ci in (2); and the welfare function for ¸ 2 (¸o1; ¸o2] is
s¸¹cq2 +
1
2
b(q1 + q2)
2; (10)
where q1 and q2 are the equilibrium outputs when ¯rm 1 chooses export but ¯rm 2 chooses FDI,
which are obtained using C1 = c1 + t and C2 = ¸¹c+ (1¡ ¸)c2 in (2).
Using (9) and (10), it is straightforward to verify the following result:23 the consumer surplus
in the range [0; ¸o1] is higher than that in the range (¸
o
1; ¸
o
2], but the FDI bene¯t in the range
[0; ¸o1] may be higher or lower than that in the range (¸
o
1; ¸
o
2]. This observation highlights the
trade-o® between a low LCR (¸ 2 [0; ¸o1]) and a high LCR (¸ 2 (¸o1; ¸o2]). If the government
attempts to impose a high LCR, it has to strike a balance between a low consumer surplus and
a potentially high FDI bene¯t.
To make our analysis interesting, we focus on the scenario in which the host government
cares su±ciently about the FDI bene¯t, for otherwise it is always optimal for the government
to set the LCR very low to minimize the losses in consumer surplus.24 Speci¯cally, we assume
that Condition 1 below holds.
Condition 1: t is not too large to rule out the export mode and s > maxfs1; s2g, where
s1 ´ ec2(2a¡ c1 ¡ c2 ¡ 2t)
3¹c(a+ c1 ¡ 2c2 ¡ 3t)
23Lemma 1 in Qiu and Tao (1999) contains this result and a formal proof.
24We have a formal proof of this claim in Qiu and Tao (1999).
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and
s2 ´ (ec1 + ec2)2t+ ec1(2a¡ c1 ¡ c2)(c1 + c2 ¡ ¹c)
2(ec1 + ec2)t¡ ec1(2a¡ c1 ¡ c2) :
Then, under Condition 1, the welfare (9) is maximized at ¸ = ¸o1 and (10) is maximized at
¸ = ¸o2. By comparing these two welfare levels, we obtain the optimal LCR ¸
¤.
Proposition 4: Suppose employment is the main FDI bene¯t and Condition 1 is satis¯ed.
Then ¸¤ = ¸o1 and both ¯rms take FDI if c2 is close to c1 (i.e., if the two ¯rms have similar
costs of production). If, however, c2 is not close to c1 (i.e., if the two ¯rms have very di®erent
costs), then ¸¤ = ¸o2 and ¯rm 1 exports while ¯rm 2 takes FDI.
Proof: See the Appendix (C). 2
The intuition for Proposition 4 is given as follows and is a result of trade-o® between high
consumer surplus and low FDI bene¯t when the LCR is low, or low consumer surplus and
possibly high FDI bene¯t when the LCR is high. First, note that since the government values
the FDI bene¯t su±ciently (Condition 1), there is a tendency to set a higher LCR. But for t
not too large (Condition 1), ¸o1 is small and so is ¸
o
2 if the cost di®erence is small, i.e., if c2 is
close to c1: Then, keeping the LCR low ensures large consumer surplus and raising ¸ can easily
lead to both ¯rms to switch to the export mode, resulting in no FDI bene¯t. Thus, it is optimal
to choose a low-level LCR, i.e., ¸¤ = ¸o1. On the contrary, ¸o2 is large when the cost di®erence
is large, i.e., when c2 is not close to c1 (but then it is close to c). In this case, the negative
impact of raising the LCR so that the low-cost ¯rm switches to exporting but the high-cost ¯rm
remains to take FDI is small. Hence, it is then optimal to set ¸¤ = ¸o2.
5.2. FDI bene¯t | technological upgrading
Now we consider the case where the host government cares about the technological catching-
up e®ect of FDI and chooses ¸ to maximize
W (¸) = s£ (¸ec1z1q1 + ¸ec2z2q2) + CS:
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As shown earlier, the optimal ¸¤ should be in either [0; ¸o1] or (¸o1; ¸o2]. Further analysis of ¸¤ for
this case is quite similar to that of Section 5.1. In particular, the welfare function becomes
s¸(ec1q1 + ec2q2) + 1
2
b(q1 + q2)
2 for ¸ 2 [0; ¸o1] (11)
s¸ec2q2 + 1
2
b(q1 + q2)
2 for ¸ 2 (¸o1; ¸o2]: (12)
Again, the consumer surplus in the range [0; ¸o1] is higher than that in the range (¸
o
1; ¸
o
2], but
the FDI bene¯t in the range [0; ¸o1] may be higher or lower than that in the range (¸
o
1; ¸
o
2].
As in Section 5.1, we also focus on the scenario in which the host government cares very
much about the FDI bene¯t. In particular, we assume:
Condition 2: t is not too large to rule out the export mode and s > maxfs3; s4g, where
s3 ´ ec2(2a¡ c1 ¡ c2 ¡ t)¡ ec2t
3ec2(a+ c1 ¡ 2c2 + t)¡ 12ec2t
and
s4 ´ (2a¡ c1 ¡ c2)(ec1 + ec2)ec1 ¡ (ec1 + ec2)2t
3ec1[(a¡ 2c1 + c2)ec1 + (a+ c1 ¡ 2c2)ec2]¡ 6t[(c¡ 2c1 + c2)ec1 + (c+ c1 ¡ 2c2)ec2] :
Under this condition, (11) is maximized at ¸ = ¸o1 and (12) is maximized at ¸ = ¸
o
2. By
comparing these two welfare levels, we obtain the optimal LCR ¸¤.
Proposition 5: : Suppose technological upgrading is the main FDI bene¯t and Condition 2 is
satis¯ed. Then ¸¤ = ¸o1; and both ¯rms take FDI if c2 is close to c1 (the two ¯rms have similar
costs of production), or if c2 is close to ¹c (the two ¯rms have very di®erent costs).
Proof: See the Appendix (D). 2
When the ¯rms' cost di®erence is small, both Propositions 4 and 5 make the same policy
recommendation of setting the LCR to the level ¸o1; for the same reason. However, when the
¯rms' cost di®erence is large, which is the case when c2 is close to c; the two propositions
suggest di®erent policy levels. To understand this di®erence, let us look at the intuition behind
Proposition 5 for the case of large cost di®erence, in which ¸o1 is small but ¸
o
2 is large. In
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principle, although consumer surplus decreases as the government raises the LCR, it could be
still desirable to have a high level of LCR if the government values the FDI bene¯t su±ciently
highly. The intuition for not setting ¸¤ = ¸o2 in the case of c2 close to c is as follows. On the
one hand, setting ¸¤ = ¸o2 means very high LCR, which reduces consumer surplus a lot. On the
other hand, as the less advanced multinational ¯rm (i.e., ¯rm 2) has a technology that is only
slightly superior to those of local upstream industries, there is limited technological upgrading if
the host government chooses a high enough LCR to induce that ¯rm to choose FDI. As a result,
it is optimal to set a low LCR, ¸¤ = ¸o1; to just obtain the technological upgrading bene¯t from
the more technologically advanced ¯rm (¯rm 1).
Finally, we would like to explore some testable implications from Propositions 4-5 and the
optimal uniform LCR policy implementation. As pointed out before, we can use observable
market shares to infer the ¯rms' cost di®erence, and technology licensing to infer whether tech-
nological upgrading is the main FDI bene¯t. Hence, if technology licensing does not occur and
if the market shares of the multinational ¯rms are not too di®erent, according to Proposition 4,
the host government should impose a low LCR on both ¯rms (the implementation issue) and we
expect to observe FDI by both ¯rms (the empirical issue). If the market shares of the ¯rms are
very di®erent, then the government should impose a high LCR on both ¯rms (the implemen-
tation issue) and we should observe that the multinational ¯rm that has a signi¯cantly higher
market share will choose the export mode and the one having a lower market share will choose
the FDI mode (the empirical issue). However, if the FDI bene¯t is mainly from technology
licensing, then according to Proposition 5, the host government should impose a low LCR on
both ¯rms regardless of the market share di®erence (the implementation issue), and we expect
to observe that both ¯rms choose the FDI mode (the empirical issue).
It is also interesting to compare the optimal discriminatory LCR policy and the optimal
uniform LCR policy. When the government uses discriminatory LCR policies, both ¯rms are
induced to choose the FDI mode and so the point is to see whether the more cost-e±cient
¯rm or the less cost-e±cient ¯rm receives a more favorable LCR policy. In contrast, under the
uniform LCR policy, since the government must o®er the same LCR to both ¯rms, the focus
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is on whether both ¯rms will be induced to choose the FDI mode, and it turns out that under
certain conditions the more e±cient ¯rm chooses the export mode while the less e±cient ¯rm
chooses the FDI mode. The main reason for such a di®erence between the two types of LCR
policies is the con°ict between the divergence in the costs of production among the multinational
¯rms and the in°exibility of the uniform LCR policy. A testable implication of this is that the
share of FDI output in total output is negatively related to the degree of uniformity of the LCR
policy.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper has made two main contributions to the FDI literature. First, it o®ers a partial
explanation of why multinationals in the same industry may adopt di®erent entry modes, namely
FDI and export, to enter the same market. We emphasize the role of the LCR policy adopted
by the host government towards FDI. We ¯nd that a ¯rm with lower production e±ciency is
more likely to adopt the FDI mode over the export mode. Second, the paper characterizes
conditions under which the host government's optimal uniform LCR policy results in both ¯rms
choosing the FDI mode or one ¯rm choosing the FDI mode and the other the export mode. It
also compares the optimal discriminatory LCRs designed for various multinational ¯rms. Some
useful and testable predictions are derived from these results.
As this paper is the ¯rst one to address the issue of MNEs' asymmetric entry modes and
to derive optimal LCR policy under this framework, it inevitably makes many simplifying as-
sumptions. Some of them may reduce the generality of the results obtained. They also suggest
directions for future research. In particular, it would be interesting to examine multinational
¯rms' entry modes and optimal LCR policies where the MNEs have di®erent degrees of vertical
integration or where their products have di®erent qualities. Another direction of future work is
to model explicitly how LCR policies a®ect technology transfer from developed to developing
countries.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 2
We now state and prove a more general proposition which contains Proposition 2 as a special
case (when the optimal LCRs are interior).
Proposition 2': There exist si and ¹si such that:
(i) The optimal LCR (¸¤1; ¸¤2) is characterized by the following:
¸¤i
8<:
= 0 for s · si;
2 (0; ¸oi ) for si < s < ¹si;
= ¸oi for s ¸ ¹si:
(ii) When s 2 (si; ¹si) (i.e., when ¸¤i is an interior solution), @¸¤i =@s > 0.
(iii) Comparison of the two optimal LCRs yields½
¸¤1 = ¸¤2 = 0 for s · s2;
¸¤1 < ¸¤2 for s > s2:
Proof. (i), (ii): Assuming an interior solution, then given any ¸j , from the ¯rst-order
condition for ¸i, @W=@¸i = 0, we obtain
¸i =
Ai + ¸jª
ª
: (A1)
Note that given ¸j , ¸i increases in s. Since ¸i is also increasing in ¸j as shown by (A1), the
optimal ¸¤i increases in s whenever it is an interior solution. This shows the existence of si and
si. If both ¸
¤
1 and ¸
¤
2 are interior solutions, then solving the two equations (i = 1; 2) in (A1)
yields the optimal policy as given below
¸¤i =
Aiªj +Ajª
ª1ª2 ¡ª2 ;
where ªi ´ (12s¹c¡eci)eci; ª ´ 3s¹c(ec1+ec2)+ec1ec2; and Ai ´ 3s¹c(a¡ 2ci+ cj)¡ (2a¡ c1¡ c2)eci;
i = 1; 2:
(iii): We now prove Proposition 2'(iii). Let us ¯rst consider the case when both ¸¤i and ¸
¤
j
are interior solution and so they are determined by the ¯rst-order conditions. For convenience,
we de¯ne MSBi(¸i) = @(FDI Benefit)=@¸i and MSCi(¸i) = @CS=@¸i. Then from (6) we
have
MSBi(¸) =
s¹c
3b
[a¡ 4¸i¹ci ¡ 2ci + ¸j(ec1 + ec2) + cj ]; i = 1; 2;
and from (4) we have
MSCi(¸) =
eci
3
(q1 + q2) =
eci
9b
(a¡ 2¸ieci ¡ 2ci + ¸jcj + cj); i = 1; 2:
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Recall that given ¸j , the optimal ¸
¤
i is given by MSBi(¸
¤
i ) =MSCi(¸
¤
i ). If MSBi(¸
0
i) > (<
)MSCi(¸
0
i), then the optimal ¸
¤
i > (<)¸
0
i. We now de¯ne
¢(¸) ´ [MSB1(¸)¡MSC1(¸)]¡ [MSB2(¸)¡MSC2(¸)] = ¢MSB(¸)¡¢MSC(¸)
=
c2 ¡ c1
9b
f3s¹c(3¡ 4¸)¡ [2a¡ 2¸(ec1 + ec2)¡ (1¡ ^¸)(c1 + c2)]g;
and have
@¢
@¸
=
c2 ¡ c1
9b
[¡12s¹c+ 2(ec1 + ec2)] < 0;
which holds under the necessary and su±cient condition for W (¸1; ¸2) to be strictly concave. It
can be checked that this condition is
s >
ec1
12¹c
; 14ec1ec2 ¡ ec21 ¡ ec22 > 0; and s > 2ec1ec2(ec1 + ec2)¹c(14ec1ec2 ¡ ec21 ¡ ec22) :
Furthermore, ¢(0) · 0 if and only if s · [2a¡ (1¡ ^¸)(c1 + c2)]=9¹c, which holds for large a and
s · ¹si. Therefore, ¢(¸) < 0 for all ¸ > 0, which implies that when MSB1(¸)¡MSC1(¸) = 0,
we still have MSB2(¸)¡MSC2(¸) > 0. That is, ¸¤2 > ¸¤1.
Now let s continue to decrease. Then the ¯rst ¸¤i to be equal to zero must be ¸
¤
1, implying
s1 > s2. As s continues to decrease slightly below s1, we argue that ¸
¤
2 is still positive. Note
that even if we still used (A1) to determine ¸¤2, by continuity we would conclude that ¸¤2 is still
positive. However, ¸¤2 should be determined in (A1) simply by setting ¸1 = 0, rather than using
the negative ¸1. Thus ¸
¤
2 is larger than if a negative ¸1 were used, and so is positive. Since ¸
¤
1 is
capped by ¸o1, lower than ¸
o
2 which caps ¸
¤
2, it is obvious that the inequality ¸
¤
1 < ¸
¤
2 still holds
when and after the upper corner solution is hit, at s1 or s2. This completes the proof of part
(iii) of the proposition.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
We now state and prove a more general proposition which contains Proposition 3 as a special
case (when the optimal LCRs are interior and s is not too large).
Proposition 3': There exist sLi ; s
H
i ; and s0 such that:
(i) The optimal LCR (¸¤1; ¸¤2) is characterized by the following:
¸¤i
8<:
= 0 for s · sLi ;
2 (0; ¸oi ) for sLi < s < sHi ;
= ¸oi for s ¸ sHi :
(ii) When s 2 (sLi ; sHi ) (i.e., when ¸¤i is an interior solution), @¸¤i =@s > 0.
(iii) De¯ning s0 = (4a ¡ 2¹c ¡ c1 ¡ c2)=6(a ¡ ¹c), the comparison of the two optimal LCRs
yields 8>><>>:
¸¤1 = ¸¤2 = 0 for s · sLi ;
¸¤1 > ¸¤2 for s 2 [sL1 ; s0);
¸¤1 = ¸¤2 > 0 for s = s0;
¸¤1 < ¸¤2 for s > s0:
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Proof. (i), (ii): The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2'. Using (4) and (8), we obtain
the ¯rst-order conditions for interior ¸¤i :
@W
@¸i
= seciµqi ¡ 2
3b
¸ieci + 1
3b
¸jecj¶¡ 1
3
(q1 + q2)eci = 0; i = 1; 2; i 6= j:
Substituting q1 and q2 into the ¯rst-order condition yields
¸i =
1
(12s¡ 1)eci [3s(a¡ 2ci + cj)¡ (2a¡ c1 ¡ c2) + ¸jecj(1 + 6s)]: (A2)
Solving the two equations in (A2) gives ¸¤i as in Proposition 3. De¯ne
sLi ´
4a¡ 3ci ¡ cj
6(a¡ ci) ; s
H
i ´
4a¡ 3ci ¡ cj ¡ 4t
6(a¡ ci ¡ 2t) :
Then ¸¤i = 0 for s ·sLi , ¸¤i = ¸oi for s ¸sHi , and ¸¤i 2 (0; ¸oi ) for s 2 (sLi ; sHi ). Di®erentiating
¸¤i with respect to s gives rise to
@¸¤i
@s
=
3(2a¡ c1 ¡ c2)
4eci(3s¡ 1)2 > 0:
We now look at the case when not all ¸¤i are interior solutions. Recall from the analysis
preceding Proposition 3 that given ¸j, ¸i increases in s. Since ¸i is also increasing in ¸j as
shown by (A2), the optimal ¸¤i increases in s whenever it is an interior solution. This shows the
existence of sLi and s
H
i . This completes the proof of Proposition 3'(i) and (ii).
(iii): Using ¸¤i , direct comparison leads to ¸¤1 < ¸¤2 i® s > s0. In addition, it is easily
checked that s0 > s
L
2 > s
L
1 and s0 < minfsH1 ; sH2 g for t not too big. We now examine the case
when one of ¸¤i is not interior solution. As s continues to decrease slightly below s
L
2 , we argue
that ¸¤1 is still positive. Note that if we still use (A2) to determine ¸¤1, by continuity ¸¤1 is still
positive. However, ¸¤1 should be simply determined in (A2) by setting ¸2 = 0, rather than using
the negative ¸2. As a result, ¸
¤
1 is larger than if a negative ¸2 is used and so is positive. This
shows that the inequality ¸¤1 > ¸¤2 still holds for s 2 (sL1 ; sL2 ]. On the other hand, since ¸¤1 is
capped by ¸o1, lower than ¸
o
2 which caps ¸
¤
2, it is obvious that the inequality ¸
¤
1 < ¸
¤
2 still holds
when and after the upper corner solution is hit, at sH1 or s
H
2 . This completes the proof of part
(iii) of the proposition.
C. Proof of Proposition 4
Here we only provide a proof for the case where t is very large [in (i) below] or very small
[in (ii)]. However, the proposition also applies to the case where t does not take these extreme
values. The proof of the intermediate t case will be provided upon request or can be found in
Qiu and Tao (1999).
Let us ¯rst give a preliminary result which is used in the proof of the proposition below.
Suppose we de¯ne Ua(¸) as the function given in (9) and Ub(¸) as the function given in (10),
and extend these two functions to the entire domain of [0,1]. Then, in addition to the result
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stated in the text after (9) and (10), we also know that within the range [0; ¸o1], both the FDI
bene¯t and the consumer surplus of Ua(¸) are higher than those of Ub(¸): To see this, note that
for ¸ within the same range [0; ¸o1], C2 of Ua is equal to C2 of Ub, but C1 of Ua is lower than
C1 of Ub: Thus, the consumer surplus of Ua is higher than that of Ub. On the other hand, for
¸ 2 [0; ¸o1] the FDI bene¯t of Ua and that of Ub have the same ¸, but it can be easily checked
that q1 + q2 of Ua is higher than q2 of Ub. Thus, the FDI bene¯t of Ua is also higher than that
of Ub:
(i) Suppose t is so large that t=ec1 = ¸o1 = 1. Then ¸o2 is also capped at 1. In this case, the
comparison of Ua(¸) and Ua(¸) is really conducted in the same range of ¸: [0; ¸
o
1] or [0; 1]. Then
from the preliminary result above we know that both the consumer surplus and the FDI bene¯t
of Ua(¸
o
1) are higher than those of Ub(¸
o
2). Hence it is optimal to set ¸
¤ = ¸o1.
(ii-a) Suppose t is so small that ¸o1 is close to zero, say ¸
o
1 = ". If c2 is close to c1, then ¸
o
2
is also close to zero, namely ¸o2 = ". In this case the comparison of Ua(¸
o
1) and Ub(¸
o
2) is really
conducted in the same range of ¸: [0; ¸o1] or [0; "]. Then from the preliminary result above, we
know that both the consumer surplus and FDI bene¯t of Ua(¸
o
1) are higher than those of Ub(¸
o
2).
Hence it is optimal to set ¸¤ = ¸o1.
(ii-b) If instead c2 is close to c, then t=(c ¡ c2) becomes very large and ¸o2 is capped at 1.
Given that s is su±ciently large (i.e., Condition 1), the host government cares almost exclusively
about the FDI bene¯t when deciding ¸¤. The FDI bene¯t of Ua approaches zero because ¸o1 = ",
whereas the FDI bene¯t of Ub (i.e., ¸
o
2scq2 or scq2) is positive. Hence it is optimal to set
¸¤ = ¸o2.
D. Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is similar to that for Proposition 4 except the part for the case of small t and c2
close to c: De¯ne Ua(¸) as the function given in (11) and Ub(¸) as the function given in (12),
and extend these two functions to the entire domain of [0,1]. As t becomes small, ¸o1 approaches
zero and hence the FDI bene¯t of Ua approaches zero. Meanwhile, as c2 approaches c, t=ec2
becomes very large and ¸o2 is capped at 1. But the FDI bene¯t of Ub [i.e., ¸
o
2s(c ¡ c2)q2] also
approaches zero, because c ¡ c2 approaches zero. Hence the comparison of Ua and Ub depends
on the comparison of consumer surplus. From the result stated in the text after (11) and (12),
we know that the consumer surplus of Ua is higher than that of Ub. Thus we conclude that
¸¤ = ¸o1.
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